GET /v1/config

The degraded-mode contract: what a PEP does with a gated action when it cannot reach the runtime — timeout, 429, 5xx, or network partition. A runtime outage (or an attacker-induced partition) must not force a binary choice between blocking every unattended agent and silently allowing gated actions; this endpoint is where the deployer's answer lives.

GET {base_url}/v1/config
Authorization: Bearer ogr_<key>

Response — `200`

{ "on_unreachable": { "security.*": "block", "safety.*": "allow" } }

Field	Type	Description
`on_unreachable`	object	Map of category prefix → action, applied by the PEP while the runtime is unreachable

Keys are taxonomy category prefixes (security.*, security.malicious_command, safety.*, …). The PEP applies longest-prefix match: an entry for security.malicious_command beats one for security.*.

Values:

Value	Meaning while unreachable
`block`	Deny the gated action
`allow`	Permit the gated action (explicit fail-open)
`require_local_approval`	Suspend; a human approves through a channel that does not depend on runtime availability (in-terminal prompt, in-session ask)

Defaults are conservative

A category with no entry defaults to block for security.*. The safety.* default is the deployer's explicit choice. Enforcement is entirely the PEP's responsibility — the runtime is only the config source; by definition it is not there when the config applies.

require_local_approval is the intended middle path: it avoids both approval-fatigue-inducing hard blocks and the worst outcome, silent fail-open. An approval that would itself require calling the runtime does not qualify.

Caching guidance

Fetch and cache this at startup, and refresh periodically (each successful refresh replaces the cache). The cached copy is what you consult at the exact moment the runtime is unreachable — a PEP that fetches config lazily on first failure has no policy when it needs one. Also remember: a 429 on /v1/evaluate counts as unreachable and triggers this same policy.

Example

curl -s $OGR_RUNTIME/v1/config -H "Authorization: Bearer $OGR_API_KEY"

Python

from openguardrails import RuntimeClient

client = RuntimeClient()
config = client.get_config()
on_unreachable = config.get("on_unreachable", {})
# cache it; consult with longest-prefix match when evaluate fails

JavaScript

import { RuntimeClient } from "@openguardrails/core"

const client = new RuntimeClient()
const config = await client.getConfig()
const onUnreachable = config.onUnreachable ?? {}   // wire key on_unreachable, camelCased

Degraded-mode specification — normative requirements: local hard rules stay enforced, loud entering/leaving signaling, buffered events replayed (batch-signed) on reconnect, queue-with-timeout for unattended agents.
POST /v1/evaluate failure handling.